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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
PATENT LAW-"FLASH OF GENIUS" TEST FOR
INVENTION REJECTED
Plaintiff brought suit for damages based upon the alleged infringement
of his U.S. Patent No. 2,398,382 on a method for applying low-reflective
films of inorganic salts on the surfaces of optical elements such as lenses.
A judgment in favor of plaintiff by the United States District Court in
New York found all claims of the patent valid and granted an injunction
against further infringement and an accounting for profits and damages
resulting from the infringement. Defendant optical company conceded
infringement but appealed on the grounds, among other contentions, that
the patent was invalid because of lack of invention, in that plaintiff's con-
tribution to the art was not sufficient to support a patent in the light of
the "flash of genius" test laid down in Cuno Corp. v. Automatic Devices
Corp.' The Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge L.
Hand, rejected the subjective test contended for, and held that invention
today is measured by the statutory requirement. 2 Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb
Optical Co., 224 F. 2d 530 (C.A. 2d, 1955).
The American system of patents finds its fundamental basis in the
constitutional provision, which provides:
The Congress shall have power .. .to promote the progress of science and
the useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the ex-
clusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.3
The Constitution leaves to the discretion of Congress the manner in
which such rights are to be protected. Congress, pursuant to the consti-
tutional grant has passed various statutes setting up the procedural aspects
of the patent system, but the main body of substantive patent law, re-
lating particularly to questions of novelty and infringement, has been
left for the courts to develop. The early case of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood4
laid, down a standard of invention which was subsequently recognized
as authority by courts faced with the baffling problem of what constitutes
"patentable invention." Beginning in about 1930, the Supreme Court
began to evidence a stricter view of patents than had been taken during the
past 100 years. This modern trend to a harsh approach toward patents
culminated in the "flash of genius" test promulgated in the Cuno case and
reaffirmed in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in the case of
A & P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp.5 Congress, recognizing that such a
strict interpretation of patentability would destroy well established doc-
1314 U.S. 84 (1941).
266 Stat. 798 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. 103 (1954). 452 U.S. 261 (1850).
8 U.S. Const. Art. I, S 8. 5 340 U.S. 147 (1950).
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trines developed in the case law of the past century, took advantage of
the opportunity offered during general revision of the United States Code
to insert as a part of the new patent law a clause providing a standard of
patentable novelty. 6
Although novelty is recognized as a requirement for invention, 7 the
courts have always had difficulty in defining the degree of novelty neces-
sary to support invention. The Supreme Court as early as 1850 recognized
that an invention, although new, might not be patentable unless it involves
so-called "patentable novelty" or some patentable differences over the
prior art. The test imposed in the Hotchkiss case required that an inven-
tion to be patentable must have been the result of "more ingenuity and skill
• . . than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the
business."8
That every slight improvement is not necessarily of a quality which will
constitute "patentable invention" was stated in Atlantic Works v. Brady.9
To grant to a single party monopoly of every slight advance made, except
where the exercise of invention, somewhat above ordinary mechanical or engi-
neering skill is distinctly shown, is unjust in principle and injurious in its conse-
quences. 10
That mere trivial change may nevertheless amount to invention under
proper circumstances was reflected in Eibel Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario
Paper Co.," in which the court found that a mere change in the pitch of
a wire which fed stock to a paper-making machine was sufficient to com-
prise invention. In reaching this conclusion the court relied on particular
facts which satisfied so-called objective tests of invention. The court found
that the improvement of Eibel had been generally adopted by the indus-
try, that the alleged invention resulted in a greatly improved capacity of
the machine for producing paper free of flaws, and that, although the im-
provement was apparently simple, it solved a problem long faced by users
of the particular machine. The courts, in determining the presence of in-
vention, have sought positive answers to questions such as the following
to prove that the alleged invention was beyond mere skill of the calling:
Did the achievement fill a long-felt need in the industry?12
Did the achievement bring about new and unexpected results? 13
666 Stat. 798 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. 103 (1954).
766 Star. 797 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. 101 (1954).
8 Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 261, 266 (1850).
9 107 U.S. 192 (1882).
10 Ibid., at 200. 11261 U.S. 45 (1923).
12 Goodyear Co. v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 321 U.S. 275 (1944).
13Ludlum Steel Co. v. Terry, 37 F. 2d 153 (N.D. N.Y., 1928).
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Did the achievement constitute the last step necessary to make a practical
reality of what others had unsuccessfully groped for?14
Was the device adopted and used by everyone? 15
While the objective tests described above were generally followed by
the federal courts, the case of Cuno Corp v. Automatic Devices Corp.16
decided by the Supreme Court in 1941 was widely interpreted as setting
forth a new and stricter requirement for "patentable invention." Although
repeating the requirements of the Hotchkiss case, Mr. Justice Douglas
went on to say: "The new device, however useful it may be, must reveal
the flash of creative genius, not merely the skill of the calling,"'17 and called
for a strict interpretation of this test. That Mr. Justice Douglas had more
in mind than mere proof that the alleged invention was one not obvious
to the ordinary mechanic skilled in the art is further evidenced by his in-
tion of the terpretation of the constitutional provision as requiring that the
inventor's art be such that "his skill in making this contribution reached
the level of inventive genius which the Constitution (Art. 1 Sec. 8) au-
thorizes Congress to reward.'
8
The requirement set out by Mr. Justice Douglas in the Cuno case gave
rise to much surprise and criticism, both in the lower courts and among
commentators, and conjecture as to whether a new and stricter test of
patentable invention had been deliberately promulgated, or whether the
expression "flash of genius" was a mere literary flourish appended to a re-
statement of the old law in line with the greater mechanical skill which, be-
cause of an advanced technology, could be imputed to the ordinary man
skilled in the art.19
That Mr. Justice Douglas intended a new standard of invention above
and beyond that of the Hotchkiss case was evidenced in the concurring
opinion of A & P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp.20 In this opin-
ion the concept of "inventive genius" was reiterated, and expanded in the
light of the requirement, deduced from the Constitution, that the inven-
tion be more than a mere gadget.
It is not enough that an article is new and useful. The Constitution never
sanctioned the patenting of gadgets. Patents serve a higher end-the advance-
ment of science. An invention need not be as startling as an atomic bomb to be
patentable. But it has to be of such quality and distinction that masters of the
scientific field in which it falls will recognize it as an advance.21
'4 The Barbed Wire Patent, 143 U.S. 275 (1892).
1 Minerals Separation Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261 (1916).
16 314 U.S. 84 (1941).
17 Ibid., at 91.
18 Ibid.
19 Falkenberg v. Bernard Edward Co., 175 F. 2d 427 (C.A. 7th, 1949).
20 340 U.S. 147 (1950). 21 Ibid., at 155.
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Despite the opportunity offered in the A & P case to affirm the doc-
trine elucidated in the prior Cuno case, it is significant that the majority
opinion rested on a finding of mere aggregation, in that the elements
which made up the device sought to be patented did not perform any
additional or different function in the device than they performed out
of it. Failing to find a true combination, the court was not constrained to
rule on the presence or absence of invention.
The extreme degrees of strictness exhibited by a number of judicial
opinions over the past decade based on a literal application of the Cuno
rule resulted in so few patents being validated by the courts that Mr. Jus-
tice Jackson, was led to comment ". . . that the only patent which is valid
is one which this Court has not been able to get its hands on." 22
Congress in the Patent Act of 1952 inserted a new section which pro-
vided:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically dis-
closed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the difference
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the in-
vention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in
which the invention was made.23
The Reviser's note which accompanied the bill is helpful in analyzing
the legislative intent incorporating section 103 into the Act.
There is no provision corresponding to the first sentence explicitly stated in
the present statutes, but the refusal of patents by the Patent Office, and the
holding of patents invalid by the courts, on the ground of lack of invention or
lack of patentable novelty has been followed since at least as early as 1850. This
paragraph is added with the view that an explicit statement in the statute may
have some stabilizing effect, and also to serve as a basis for the addition at a
later time of some criteria which may be worked out.
The second sentence states that patentability as to this requirement is not
to be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made, that is, it is
immaterial whether it resulted from long toil and experimentation or from a
flash of genius.24
It should be noted that in the first paragraph of the Reviser's note, the
continuity of decisions on the grounds of lack of patentable novelty since
1850 is pointed out, but the statement begs the question of the standard of
invention needed for patentability. Criteria of invention may be formu-
lated at some later date, but it is clear at least that the "flash of genius" test
is here legislatively disavowed. Although an alleged invention may be the
22 Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949).
2366 Stat. 798 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (1954).
24 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (1954), Historical & Revision Notes thereto.
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result of the flash of creative genius, the absence of that element will not,
in the future, negative invention.
What has been the effect of the new Patent Act on the determination
by the courts of the presence or absence of "patentable invention"? An
analysis of appeals courts' decisions since January 1, 1953, shows that
where mere aggregation has been found, the courts have relied on the
first sentence of paragraph 103 of the Act. And it has consistently been
reiterated that this sentence did not change the common law rule, devel-
oped since the Hotchkiss case, that something more is necessary for inven-
tion than is obvious to the skilled mechanic. 25
Thus, where aggregation alone has been found, that is, where nothing
new, however trifling an advance, results from activity, it is apparently
not necesary to consider the question of "flash of genius."
The cases subsequent to the Act which have found invention have
first, of necessity, applied the "obviousness" test of paragraph 103. And the
measure of obviousness, as determined in the past and repeated by Judge
Hand, is an objective test. Given the fact that some advance has been
made, that is, that more than mere aggregation is involved, its status as in-
vention is measured by the finding:
The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been
seeking a ... coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of at-
tempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had
been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted
the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field.26
In the case of Pacific Contact Laboratories v. Solex Laboratories,2 7 ob-
jective tests are likewise relied upon, namely, a failure of the art to adopt
existing devices to the alleged inventive use and immediate commercial
success of the new device, to prove that the device was not obvious to a
skilled mechanic.
It is only after a finding of invention, based on time-honored objective
tests supported by proper application of the first sentence of 35 U.S.C. 103,
that the courts are faced with the test of "flash of genius." The Solex case
rejects this test in the light of the second sentence of paragraph 103
and the legislative intent as evidenced by the Reviser's note.
In the instant case, the alleged invention is clearly stated by Judge
Hand not to measure up to the strict juridical approach taken during
recent years:
25 Wasserman v..Burgess & Blacher Co., 217 F. 2d 402 (C.A. 1st, 1954); Interstate
Rubber Products Corp. v. Radiator Specialty Co. Inc., 214 F. 2d 546 (C.A. 4th, 1954);
General Motors Corp. v. Estate Stove Co., 203 F. 2d 912 (C.A. 6th, 1953); Stanley
Works v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 203 F. 2d 846 (C.A. 3d, 1953).
26 Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 224 F. 2d 530, 535 (C.A. 2d, 1955).
2 209 F. 2d 529 (C.A. 9th, 1953).
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On the other hand, it must be owned that, had the case come up for de-
cision within the twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five years before the Act of 1952
went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would
have been held invalid.28
In failing to cite the Cuno case, it is evident that Judge Hand finds "pat-
entable invention" sufficiently described by the case law and the statute,
and recognizes the legislative right: ". . . reinstate the courts' initial inter-
pretation, even though it may have been obscured by a series of later com-
ments whose upshot is at best hazy." 29
Thus, the implication arises that, at best, Judge Hand treats "flash of
genius" as an unwarranted deviation from established case law.
Finally, in the case of R. M. Palmer Co. v. Luden's Inc.,30 the court
held a design patent for a hollow chocolate figure valid, finding that the
designs were new, original and ornamental, and, tested objectively, the al-
leged invention met the standard of 35 U.S.C. 103. Further, the court
clearly pointed out that the Act repudiated the "flash of genius" require-
ment, thus confirming in statutory form what had been case law for many
years prior thereto.
2 s Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 224 F. 2d 530, 535 (C.A. 2d, 1955).
29 Ibid., at 537. 30 128 F. Supp. 672 (E.D. Pa., 1955).
SALES-HOLDER OF CERTIFICATE OF TITLE ESTOPPED
BY TRANSFER OF AUTOMOBILE IN ORDINARY
COURSE OF BUSINESS
Plaintiffs, who are wholesale automobile dealers in New Mexico and
Colorado, sold several automobiles at their places of business to a licensed
used car dealer from Utah. Possession of the automobiles was transferred
to the purchaser with knowledge that he was a used car dealer and that
he intended to take the automobiles to his place of business in Utah for
purpose of resale. The foreign certificates of title showing plaintiffs to be
the legal owners together with sight drafts were forwarded to a Utah
bank on an agreement that the buyer would pay the drafts before obtain-
ing the certificates. The buyer never paid the drafts and never received
the certificates. About a month later, the retailer sold the automobiles to
the defendants at his place of business in Utah in the usual course of trade
for a valuable consideration. Defendants made no inquiry of him as to the
title certificates or his authority to sell, and had no actual knowledge of
the original sales arrangement. Plaintiffs brought the replevin actions in
Utah for the automobiles. The Utah Supreme Court, refusing to apply a
Utah automobile statute, denied recovery on the ground of estoppel.
Heaston v. Martinez, 282 P. 2d 833 (Utah, 1955).
